Read recent examples of airspace occurrences below.
Occurrence number: 23/2666
Date: 16 April 2023
Time: 10:15 NZST
Location: Near Darfield
Airspace: CH CTA/C
Nature of flight: Private X-country
The aircraft briefly flew into a 1500' sector of the CH CTA/C without a clearance, near Darfield while flying a direct track from NZAS to NZOM.
The direct track near NZCH has the following CTA sector restrictions, not above; 5500', 3500', 2500' and 1500'.
The aircraft inadvertently entered the 1500’ sector of airspace without a clearance, however the pilot soon realised and immediately vacated the CTA.
The pilot (and his instructor) have since analysed the error and advised CAA of several preventative safety actions intended to reduce the chances of repetition. They are:
Subsequently the CAA accepted the pilot’s safety actions and did not investigate this occurrence further, beyond thanking him for his report and his proactive engagement with the CAA.
Occurrence number: 22/6687
Date: 31 October 2022
Time: 12:30 NZDT
Location: Oamaru (NZOU)
Airspace: Unattended aerodrome occurrence - Class G airspace
Nature of flight: Private
A dual training flight landed on grass runway 02 at Oamaru and was backtracking on the runway, because there is no associated taxiway. A Cessna 185 that had joined long final was then on short final for grass 02.
The taxiing aircraft expedited its taxiing to avoid a possible conflict. However, the C185 flew over them and landed late on the remaining runway. After the incident the C185 pilot allegedly told the instructor he didn't want to carry out a go-around because he thought there was enough runway left to land safely.
The CAA investigation pointed out to the C185 pilot that he had breached several rules by continuing to land on an occupied runway, and that a go-around was his last 'legal' option. The alternatives such as orbiting or slowing down earlier (if safe) were also discussed, as they may have prevented him from having the occurrence in the first place, or that he could have joined long final for sealed runway 36 instead, as the other aircraft was landing ahead of him on grass 02.
The investigation suggested to the QA manager of the other operator that having their pilots add the words 'will need to backtrack on runway 02', or words to that effect, to a downwind or a long final radio call, may help following pilots realise that a separation conflict may develop and that they need to safely plan for such an possibility.
It is noted that this is not the only aerodrome or airfield in New Zealand where this scenario may occur.
The investigation was closed because the pilot is now fully aware of the relevant rules and what the appropriate and safer options are in the future.
Occurrence number: 22/1311
Date: 04 March 2022
Time: 02:45 UTC
A Hokitika aerodrome runway inspection officer heard a King Air making radio calls within the MBZ and that it was on final for runway 03. The officer then happened to look at final approach for runway 30 and saw a light aircraft on final for that runway too. He had not heard any radio calls from that aircraft, so he used his radio to alert the King Air crew of the conflict and they immediately executed a go-around.
The officer approached the light aircraft pilot after the aircraft shut-down and inquired about the absence of radio calls. It was at this time that the pilot realised he had used his 'out-of-date' AIP and therefore the wrong frequency. He had used the old frequency (119.1) rather than 119.8 which is the correct frequency (in Feb 2022). This was despite having current maps and using a 'popular' navigation app on his phone.
The CAA investigation found that the pilot has since updated his hardcopy AIP and is having ADS-B fitted in the aircraft later this year. He will also pay more attention to his flight planning in future.
A similar incident has happened since this one and it appears that some pilots, when using navigation apps on mobile phones, may be zooming in to see more map detail but by doing so, inadvertently moving other information off the screen.
The CAA is currently focussing on incidents where a lack of flight planning or insufficient flight planning has led to occurrences.
Occurrence number: 22/343
Date: 23 January 2022
Time: 14:17 NZDT
Location: Ardmore (NZAR)
Airspace: NZAR circuit
Nature of flight: Private and training
During a go-around on approach to runway 03 at NZAR due to following jet traffic (a Challenger 604), the pilot of an RV-7 transmitted his going around radio call. At the same time, the pilot of a Piper PA28 who had joined downwind for runway 03 from Clevedon, also transmitted his downwind call. The two transmissions crossed but neither pilot was aware of this.
As the pilot of the RV-7 turned into the downwind position, a near collision occurred with the PA28. A passenger in the PA28 saw the RV-7 and warned the pilot who took immediate avoiding action.
The pilot of the RV-7 had been aware of the PA28 joining from Clevedon. However, the PA28 entered the circuit earlier than the pilot had anticipated. The downwind leg flown by the PA28 pilot was also closer to the runway than the preferred joining procedures for runway 03 when approaching from the east.
The CAA investigation noted the following contributing factors:
The operator of the PA28 conducted an internal investigation and introduced new measures to address their role in this occurrence, while the CAA communicated directly with the pilot of the RV-7. A meeting of all parties involved was also held by the aerodrome operator. The outcomes of the meeting would be discussed at the next Ardmore Flight Operations User Group meeting.
Occurrence number: 21/5136
Date: 12 September 2021
Time: 03:45 UTC
A light aircraft lined up and took off while a glider was landing. Neither crew member of the light aircraft saw the glider or heard any radio calls from it, while the glider crew did not hear the light aircraft advise it was lining up. The front seat glider pilot reported he saw the light aircraft when it climbed up ahead of him as he was about to land.
The investigation found that an inadequate lookout by the light aircraft crew before entering the runway was a primary factor in this occurrence. The absence of any radio calls also reinforced their belief there was no circuit traffic. The investigation also noted that the light aircraft’s 'line up call' was of a much lower transmission strength than its previous radio call, which may have contributed to it not being heard by the glider crew.
Another identified factor was that the glider’s 'front seat' radio transmit button had an intermittent fault, and therefore its radio calls were not heard.
The light aircraft operator now further encourages the need for pilots to thoroughly scan final approach for any traffic, especially those that may be flying a different approach path or NORDO aircraft, before taxiing on to a runway.
The gliders front seat radio transmit button has since been replaced.